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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of Chi* report is to appraise recent developments in the
International grain trade which may effect the future volume of U.S. grain
exports. These developments include regional integration systems such as
the European Economic Community (E.E.C.), the Central American Integration
System (C.A.I.S.), the Latin American Free Trade Area U.A.F.T.A.), the Arab
Common Market (A .CM.) and the United Kingdom market (U.K.). The report
reviews policy and regulatory developments in these areaa. A general review
of International commodity agreements relating to grain la also outlined In
the study. The changing role and policies of the U.S. Government in grain
exports and food aid la given by showing new policy changes in the Agricul-
tural Trade Development end Assistance Act of 1954—commonly known as Public
Law 480.
Since this work Involved an examination of grain trade barriers and
restrictions, close attention was paid to the development and outcome of the
negotiations of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade which were held
In Geneva from September 1966 to January 1967. These are commonly known as
the Kennedy Round In honor of the late President of the U.S. who proposed
them. A preliminary examination of the International Gralna Agreement which
resulted from the conclusion of these negotiations is submitted, and an
attempt is made to appraise the effects which this agreement will have on
future U.S. grain export*.
The report outlines possible policy end institutional adjustments In
the U.S. grain trade which might increase U.S. commercial grain aales
a broad
.
Vbrld wheat production increased from an average of 164.7 million
metric tona during 1949-30 to 1953-54 to an estimated 274 million metric
2
tona during 1966-67. Wheat accounta for 302 of world grain production of
which the U.S. produced 13.'..
About 25% of world wheat production goea into world trade which
amounted to 62.3 million metric tona during cereal year 1965-66 of which
the United Statca exported 23.4 million metric tona. About 16 million tona
of U.S. wheat waa exported under government-assisted programa.
World wheat ttocka declined from 60 million tona in 1960-61 to 29
million tona in 1966. The U.S. Department of Agriculture on the recommenda-
tion of the National Grain Advieory Committee agreed on a policy aimed at
maintaining U.S. wheat stocks at a level of 10 million tona lnatead of 15-17
million tona which ha* traditionally been recommended.
World production of feed gralna lncreaaed from 305 million tona in
1950 to 445 million tona during 1965-66 of which the U.S. produces one-
third.
World trade in feed gralna lncreaaed from an average of 13.7 million
International Wheat Council, Trend* and Problems In the World Sraln
Economy 1950-70, p. 1, Table 1, 1966.
2
United States Department of Agriculture, The World Agricultural
Situation—Review of 1966 and Outlook for 1967. Foreign Agricultural
Economic Report, No. 33, p. 13, January 4, 1967.
International Wheat Council, Reyltw of the Worjd yheat Situation,,
p. 78, Table 34, 1966.
4
Ibid ., p. 80.
5
ibid ., p. 42, Table 22.
tons during 1949-34 to 42.7 million ton* during 1965-66 of which the U.S.
exported 24.7 Billion metric ton*. Only 8-1C , of total feed grain* produc-
tion go** into world trad* and 801 of world trade i* between developed
countrle* like the United State*, Canada, and Ueatern Europe.
World feed grain stocks amounted to 50 million metric tons in 1964-65.
The U.S. government considered that the strategic stockpile reserve for feed
grain* was 41 million metric tons.
6
lteid... p. 56.
The National Agricultural Advisory Conmission, Report of Subcommittee
on Food and Fiber Reserve* for National Security. Washington, D.C., October,
1964.
CHAPTER I
REGIONAL INTEGRATION SCHEMES
The European Economic Community
The European Econoalc Community is an Important cash outlet for U.S.
B
grain. In 1965 the E.E.C. Imported 3,789,000 metric tons of wheat of which
the United States supplied 1,077,000 metric tons—(25X of U.S. commercial
exports). The E.E.C. is a much bigger importer of feed grains—It Imported
14,209,000 metric tons during 1965, and the United States supplied
8,351,000 metric tons of this feed grain. The U.S. share of the E.E.C.
wheat market has been constant at just over 1 million tons since 1962, how-
ever, the U.S. share of the E.E.C. feed grain market has increased from 2.7
million during 1956 to the 1966 figure of 8.8 million metric tons. The
E.E.C. is likely to continue to buy its future supplies of hard wheats of
high protein and quality in the U.S. and Canada and her future feed grain
imports are likely to Increase.
The E.E.C. increased its wheat exports to non-aember countries from
1.0S million in 1958 to 3.8 million tons in 1965. During the same period.
a
United States Department of Agriculture, France' a Key Role in the
Grain Sector of the European Economic Community. Foreign Agricultural
Service Report No. 122, Washington, D.C., p. 4, April, 1963.
9
Ibid ., p. 14.
United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Trade
of the United States . Economic Research Service, p. 8, Washington, D.C.,
Msrch, 1967.
E.E.C. feed grain exports Increased from 94 thousand tons In 1958 to 2
million tons in 1965 (75,, barley, 25,. corn). France played the dominant
role in this export trade.
Wheat production in the E.E.C. has remained constant at 26 million
tons while feed grain production has increased from 23.4 to 26.2 million
tons
1 between 1962 end 1965. E.E.C. sources Indicate that the region's
feed grain production will be well over 30 million tons with French maize
12
production increasing by 25i to 5.5 million tons by 1970.
Since the E.E.C. is an Important market for U.S. grains, it is neces-
sary to summarize the E.E.C. grain prices and regulations as they affect
U.S. grain exports to this area after June, 1967.
The basic E.E.C. grain regulations maintain a system of support prices
through import levies but abolishes Import quotas and all forms of quantita-
tive restrictions.
Basically then, the E.E.C. levy system functions ss follows: a
so-called basic target price is established for the major deficit area and
the price of grain from third countries is increased to E.E.C. levels by
means of the import levy which forms the so-called threshold price.
The hub of the E.E.C. price structure is the target price, to which
threshold prices and levies are related by regulations. These target
prices are designed to be applicable at the wholesale levels of trade.
The aim is to maintain one basic target price for each of the various
U
Ibid .. p. 18, Table 7.
12
Butterwick, M. W. and E. Neville Rolfe, Ma.rk.et Structure, fi-f, eefjtp
forts . United States Feed Grains Council, Oxford University, October, 1966,
p. 28.
type* of grain throughout the community which will be administered by one
market organization. Related to this bade target price and taking freight
coat Into account a aerie* of target Intervention prices are fixed for cer-
tain point* or areaa. At these points, all grain offered at the pertaining
intervention price* has to be taken over by the governments (only grain that
does not find a ready market above the Intervention level is handled in this
way). Regulation* require that intervention price* be 90 to 95 percent of
the designated target prices. In effect, intervention price* are support
prices at the wholesale level closest to producers. For that reason, they
have a significant influence on farm return*.
Effective July 1, 1967, the grain trade in the member countries of the
E.E.C. will operate under a common price policy and with common regulations.
The aim will be to maintain a common wholesale or target price throughout
the community. Infra-community levies and other national price differential*
will then be abolished.U
In agreeing on a system of uniform grain prices in December, 1964, the
E.E.C. fortified Its position vis a vis the Kennedy round tariff negotia-
tions. In effect, the Common Market officials argued that they were unable
to consider reductions In the levies on grains, as these would be in con-
flict with internal price and production policy, which 1* similar to the
arguments employed by the United Statea to implement Section 22 of the
Agricultural Act of 1949 preventing the interference of imports with domes-
tic farm programs.
Grain prices in the E.E.C. are guaranteed to the producer. Prices are
13
Ibid ., p. 22.
maintained above world price* by application of Import taxaa or lavlaa and
by support buying by the E.E.C. authorities. This policy Is accomplished by
applying guidelines under the general heading of target prices, Intervention
prices, threshold prices, export subsidies, and Import levies.
Target Price
Each year the authorities decide for each particular type of grain, a
target price (sometimes known as a Basic Indicative or Guide price). This
represents the level towards which the wholesale market price should tend in
the area of greatest deficit. Dulsberg in Germany is considered to be the
area of greatest deficit in the E.E.C. It must be stressed that the target
price Is the foundation on which the Common Market cereal pricing structure
rests, and is designed to be applicable at wholesale trade levels. The
target prices effective July 1, 1967-June, 1968, have been announced as:
Soft wheat v 106.20 per metric ton (>2.80 per bushel)
Corn $ 90.60 per metric ton (ftttt per bushel)
Barley $ 90.12 per metric ton (?2.05 per bushel)
Hard Red Winter
wheat yl20.00 per metric ton ($3.34 per bushel)
Intervention Price
A basic intervention price which is the wholesale market price level
in the area of greatest deficit (Dulsberg) at which the national interven-
tion agency is obliged to step in to support the market by purchasing all
offers made to it. This Is in effect a guaranteed minimum wholesale price
14
U.S. Feed Grains Council, E.E.C. Position Paper, April, 1967, p. 2.
and ranges between K and 10% below the basic indicative price or target
price.
Derived Target and Intervention Price
In the E.E.C. there are many points at which the cereal authorities
intervene to purchase grain. For this reason it is necessary to fix
Derived Target prices and Derived Intervention prices. Intervention prices
are support prices at the wholesale level closest to producers. These
prices are calculated by deducting the cost of transporting the grain from
the local point of intervention to the area of greatest deficit (Dulsberg).
Threshold Price
In order to relate international prices to the basic Community price
the Commission calculates transport costs from the main ports so that a
Threshold price can be fixed. The Threshold price represents a minimum
duty-paid or levy paid import price at which the Community will permit
cereals to be Imported into the E.E.C. The Threshold price takes into
account storage costs and quality differences, in other words, for any
product for which a Target price is specified, the Threshold price is the
applicable Target price: (1) less marketing costs (transportation, handling,
etc.} from port of entry to the deficit center for which the target price is
established; (2) plus the Import levy; and (3) plus or minus adjustment from
national-quality standard to the Community-quality standard. Threshold
prices are implemented by means of levies which are import taxes which bring
the price of Imported grain up to or near their target price value.
As of July 1, 1967, the Rotterdam Threshold prices will be the only
Threshold prices. They will be calculated by deducting from the Dulsberg
target price the marketing costs and transportation coats from Rotterdam to
Duisberg. It is expected that they will be somewhere around the following
levels. 15
Soft wheat $102.20 a metric ton or $2.76 a bushel
Corn $ 88.40 a metric ton or $2.21 a bushel
Barley $ 89.00 a metric ton or $1.92 a bushel
Sorghum $ 85.50 a metric ton
Export Subsidies
Since the E.E.C. grain price level is generally higher than that of
the world market, exports would be impossible were it not for a system of
subsidizing. Such export subsidies are referred to as "restitutions."
According to the E.E.C. regulations there ara three possibilities for pay-
ing restitutions for exports to non-member countries:
(a) cash restitutions equal to the Import levies applicable on the
export day.
(b) cash restitutions through an export tender (most favorable
bid) procedure.
(c) restitution in the font of levy-free imports of grain.
The Variable Import Levy
The variable import levies and the target prices are the key to the
Community's cereal marketing apparatus. It is necessary to emphasize that
the E.E.C. has completely abolished Import quotas for grains. These have
been replaced by variable import levies.
13
ibM-. P. 3.
10
The arithmetic involved In fixing the import levy is quite simple.
Here is roughly how the corn calculation will look on July 1, 1967:—
Rotterdam Threshold Price 2 yellow corn ?2.20 s bushel
Free Market Value 2 yellow corn delivered
Rotterdam 1.60 a bushel
$0.60 a bushel16
The levy in the illustration is 37 i of the C.I.F. price—so out of every
three bushels of corn which the Common Market imports, 2 bushels represent
the cost of the corn, and one bushel represents the value of the levy paid
for crossing the threshold of the E.E.C. The actual price paid by German
manufacturers in June, 1967, is approximately ?2.70 per bushel for corn.
The additional SO cents is caused by the E.E.C. target price plus transport
and marketing costs. In reality then the total E.E.C. import tax Is $1.10 a
bushel for com to the manufacturer and 10Z more to the producer.
This levy does two things: (a) It destroys the comparative advantage
which the U.S. has in grain production, (bj It means that in the final
analysis the Common Market customers pay the levy through higher feed costs
because they pay the price of three bushels in order to obtain two bushels.
The Impact of the E.E.C. Grain Regulations
on U.S. Grain ijcoorts
The E.E.C. is likely to allow imports to supply 1C. of total require-
ments in the case of wheat and 15,. of total requirements In the case of
16
lbld .. p. It.
Latter from Mr. Clarence Palmby, Director of United States Feed
Grain Council to Secretary of Agriculture, Orvllle Freeman, February 3, 1967.
18
Dreyer, H. P. "World Grain Pact Still Cloudy," Journal of "ramam
.
p. 3, April, 1967.
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feed grains. This will mean that U.S. grain exports to that region will
likely be static in the case of wheat and nay increase slowly In the case of
feed grains over the next five yeara.
The implementation of the common grain price in July, 1967 Is unlikely
to have Immediate effects on U.S. grain exports to the E.E.C. It will how-
ever have a significant effect on grain price levels in the E.E.C. during
the next two years. It Is expected that unified prices will be considerably
higher than world prices. In the case of soft wheat a compromise between
high German and lower French prlcea may reduce the overall target price in
the Common Market. In the case of corn and barley France is the principal
producer and target prices are expected to Increase, thereby putting the
U.S. In a less favorable position in the feed grain market.
In the long term it would seem that the U.S. is at the mercy of the
E.E.C. variable levy system since the E.E.C. refuses to give guaranteed
market accessibility.
In the future, variable levies could be applied in an exceedingly
reatrictlve manner to the detriment of imports. They could also be applied
in a liberal manner so as to permit reasonable access for imports. The
E.E.C. has given assurances that the latter Is its intention.
A test of whether this Intention is achieved Is the level of internal
support prices which the E.E.C. finally determines. Should these be set too
high, domestic production will be excessively stimulated and Imports will be
subject to more restrictive levies.
In the final analysis three factors are of importance to the U.S.
(a) The uae of the C.A.T.T. negotiating machinery In future yeara as a
politico-economic lever to obtain Improved accessibility to the E.E.C.
12
grain market based on "quid pro quo" trading concessions and the
principle of comparative advantage. These pressures must be aimed
specifically at reduction of the domestic target prices of the E.E.C.
(b) With rising living standards more meat will be consumed by the huge
population of the E.E.C. They will tend to demand low cost, high
quality meat. Similarly it is likely the number of E.E.C. farmers will
decline in the long term. This leaves us with a situation in which
both meat producers and consumers will form a strong political lobby
for cheap grain Imports. This will help the U.S.
(c) If the U.S. is to begin to negotiate successfully with the E.E.C, it
will be necessary to repeal the agricultural Import legislation embodied
in Section 22 of the Agricultural Act of 1949. This would undoubtedly
improve the E.E.C. attitude to increased U.S. imports.
19
Id) Finally U.S. grain Interests are understandably concerned regarding
the sincerity of the E.E.C. in implementing Its common agricultural
price in grains. If this were implemented in Germany for example, feed
grain prices would have to be reduced by 14,. a factor which would be of
enormous help to U.S. feed grain sales In Germany. As yet the Germans
have only reduced their grain price by approximately U and there are
no indications that further reductions will be made.
The Central American Integration Scheme (C.A.l.S.)
C.A.I.S. is sometimes referred to as the Central American Common
Market. This integration scheme is based on the General Treaty on Central
19
Letter from Mr. Clarence Palmby, Director of United States Feed Grain
Council to Ambassador William Roth, Chief of U.S. Delegation to the
G.A.T.T., February, 1967.
13
American Integration which was signed by Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. By 1965 a common external tariff vaa established.
20
Intra regional trade has expanded at a rate of 42 percent per year compared
to 11 percent for C.A.I.S. Imports from outside the region end was valued at
128 million dollars in 1963 compared to 8 million dollars In 1950.
The C.A.I.S. is a net importer of cereal grain. Inter regional cereal
trade was valued at 6.2 million dollars in 1962 compared to imports from the
rest of the world which were valued at 23.2 million dollars during the same
year. In 1965 C.A.I.S. members signed a special protocol on basic grains
known as the protocol of Limon which established free trade for maize and
sorghum produced within the C.A.I.S. region. The objective of the agree-
ment was the reduction of grain imports from third countries where possible.
No agreement was reached for wheat. Table 1 gives an outline of the grain
trade and production of the C.A.I.S. region.
Under the new grein protocol, common tariffs on maize and sorghum are
.08 dollars per kilogram (specific) and equal to 10 percent ad valorum. The
introduction of the common external tariff does not appear to have altered
the C.A.I.S. position with respect to imports from the outside world.
Indications are that the new tariffs may stimulate maize production
but this will depend on the nature, terms, and alee of U.S. shipments to the
srea under F.L. 480. The common tariff on sorghum is a reduction on previoua
levels of protection. While no tariff agreement has been reached import
tariffs are low and the area is greatly dependent on the U.S. and Canada for
20
F.A.O., Regional Integration Schemes Outside Europe Affecting Trade
In Grains . CR 67/5, Study Group on Grains, Item XIII of the Agenda, Table
2, p. 3, Row, March, 1967.
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TABLE 1
GRAIN TRADE AMD PRODUCTION OF THE C.A.l.S. KEG ION: WHEAT, MAIZE AND
SORGHUM IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 1960/61 AND 1964/63, AND
AVERAGE ANNUAL PRODUCTION 1948-53 AND 1961-64
Type of grain
Imports Exports Production
1960/61 1964/65 1960/61 1964/65 1948-53 1961-64
In thousand metric tons
Wheat 185.4 240.0 NA HA 21 26
Males 0.1 90.0 NA NA 1,034 1,244
Sorghum NA NA NA NA 211 225
F.A.O. Study: Regional Integration Schemes Outside Europe Affecting
Trade in Cralns, CCP CR 67/5 March 67 Study Group on Grains Item XIII of the
Agenda, Table 2, p. 3.
b
Ibld .. Tables 3 and 4, pp. 4 and 5.
NA - Not available,
wheat.
Along with the introduction of a common external tariff for grains the
C.A.l.S. countries are coordinating their national grain policies by setting
up a commission of marketing and price stabilization. This commission will
be operated by the State Grain Agencies of each member country.
A recent study indicates that gradual liberalization of trade within
the C.A.l.S. since 1960 has not led to any significant Increase in Inter-
regional trade in grains.
Future Interregional trade In grains In the C.A.l.S. region will
21
Ibid ., p. 3, Table 2.
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depend on:
(a) The volume of U.S. P.L. 480 sale* to the area,
(b) The extant of U.S. Agronomic and technical aid In the region,
(c) The availability of land, labor, and capital, and the extent to
which specialization in different groins can occur.
(d) The C.A.I.S. region is virtually self sufficient in maize which
is its principal food grain. In the case of wheat ecological limitations
hinder any significant production increase. Foreign Agricultural Service
sources indicate that as standards of living increase wheat imports (which
have now reached 240,000 tons per annua) will show a steady rise. It would
seem then that as P.L. 460 wheat sales to the area are phased out the region
may develop into a profitable commercial wheat market for the United States.
Tb» Latin American Free Trade Area (L.A.F.T.A.)
The Latin American Free Trade Area was set up under the tarns of the
Treaty of Montevideo in 1960. By the autumn of 1966 it consisted of ten
member countries, namely, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela.
The objectives of L.A.F.T.A. are the reduction of trade barriers among
member countries in order to stimulate Interregional trade. Another
L.A.F.T.A. objective is to stimulate the specialization of production In
areas best suited for different commodities. L.A.F.T.A. members hope that
by Increased interregional trade their countries will become less dependent
on the other countries of the world.
Under the Montevideo Treaty, liberalization of inter-L.A.F.T.A. trade
Is to proceed in three ways:
(1) National LISTS. National lists consist in essence of special
16
bilateral arrangements which L.A.F.T.A. members may oak* among themselves
for tha purpose of tariff reduction. Each member la required to reduce bar-
rlara on lnter-L.A.F.T.A. trade by 8 percent per year.
22
(2) Common LISTS. According to the Treaty, product* accounting for
23 percent of lnter-L.A.F.T.A. trade are to be added to a common LIST every
three yeara. The Treaty provides for complete liberalization of inter-
regional trade by 1973. When a product la on the counon list trade among
all member countries aovea duty free. Special escape clauaea exist for
agricultural products. A large proportion of inter-L.A.r .T.A . trade con-
sists of agricultural products and many sources doubt whether the aecond 23
percent reduction will be effective.
(3) Complementation Agreementa. Complementation agreements provide
for industrial specialization agreementa where members agree to specialise
in various industries in order to become more efficient producers. It is not
known whether this concept will be applied to agriculture.
A brief examination of the grain trade of the Latin American Free
trade will be most useful in assessing the future role which this area will
play within the context of the world grain situation. The following Table
summarizes the main featurea of L.A.F.T.A. imports, exports, and production.
Table 2 shows significant increases in grain production, Imports and
exports in L.A.F.T.A. The United States supplied about half of the regiona
wheat imports during 1964/65 mostly through P.L. 480. The Argentine
supplied practically all lnter-L.A.F.T.A. trade in wheat and flour during
22
Items on the common lists have not to be freed at once from all
trade restrictions and customs charges: tha complete liberalization can
be spread over the entire transitional period.
17
TABLE. 2
GRAIN TRADE OF THE L.A.F.T.A. REGION: IMPORTS, EXPORTS, AND PRODUCTION
OF SIX MAJOR GRAINS 1934/55 AND 1964/65
Type of grain
Impo rta* Exports Production
1954/55 1964/65 1954/55 1964/65 1954/55 1964/65
In thousand uetric tons
Wheat and
wheat flour 2,690 3,760 4,160 4,265 8,300 9,800
Rye - - 285 97
Barley 5 50 380 445
Oata 25 45 290 490
Sorghum alio 15 15 55 725
Maize - 200 1,870 3,470
Total coarse
grain 45 310 2,880 5,227 19,500 29,300
Total all
grain 2,735 4,070 7,040 9,492 27,800 39,100
a
E.A.O., World Grain Statistics 1964/65, p. 57, Table 29.
b
International Wheat Council, Trends and Problesis In the World Grain
Economy 1950-70.
the period. It la estimated that the Argentine produced 7 million tons out
of a total L.A.E.T.A. wheat production of 9.8 million during 1964/65. About
85 percent of L.A.F.T.A. grain imports consisted of wheat.
L.A.F.T.A. wheat exports are steady at 4 million metric tona per year.
However, coarse greln exports have increased from 2.8 million tona in 1954/55
to 5.2 million tona during 1961/65.
Wheat production in the L.A.F.T.A. has Increased slightly over the ten
18
year period. On the other hand there bee been a phenomenal lncreaae in
coarse grain production from 19 to 29 million tons during the ten year
period 1954/55 to 1964/65.
At a ' co—on list' conference at Bogota In 1964 oats was the only
grain Included. A proposal to Include wheat was not accepted. In spite of
this, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru, reduced their
tariffs on wheat Imports considerably.
Large tabulated tariff reductions have little meaning since the
governments of many L.A.F.T.A. countries operate a government import monop-
oly in all gralna. Thla in affect makes nonsense of any negotiated tariff
reductions. The prospects for free trade in wheat in L.A.F.T.A. are not
good at this time although Brazil and Peru have reduced their wheat tariff
23to zero and some trade expansion has resulted. t'.A.O. sources Indicate
that the tariff concessions on wheat and wheat flour Imports from L.A.F.T.A.
have so far not had any tangible effect on inter-area trade.
Similarly, tariff reduction in the case of rye and barley have no
practical meaning at this time. The prospects for free trade in oats la
much better since it was Included in the first common list of 1964. By the
end of 1972 lnter-L.A.F.T.A. trade in oata should be completely free.
Argentina is the sole producer and since total imports to the region were
only 18,000 tons free trade In oata is relatively meaningless and tariff
levels play no role.
Maize Imports to the region are only 1.2 percent of production.
Argentina and Brazil have made sizeable tariff cuts for maize but since
23
Ibid ., p. 16.
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these regions together produce two-thirds of the L.A.F.T.A. maize the tariff
cuts are meaningless.
The Arab Common Market
In 1964 the Arab League States established a permanent Council of Arab
Economic Unity which decided to found an Arab Common Market. The following
countries have since ratified this decision: Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria
and the United Arab Republic. It Is expected that the Arab Common Market
will develop through the stage of a free trade area into a customs union.
Interregional free trade In agricultural products is to be achieved by
January 1, 1969.
Trade in wheat, barley, maize, and rice between the member states of
the A.C.H. is virtually exempt from customs and other duties and taxes.
Trade In wheat flour and grain starch produced within the area is to be
liberalised on the schedule as shown In Table 3.
U.S.D.A. sources Indicate that imports of grains Into the five Arab
countries (2.6 million tons In 1961-63) are likely to continue to Increase.
Per capita consumption of wheat, though relatively high already, should show
a further moderate increaae as consumers shift away from other grains. The
requirements of coarse grains for animal feed la also expected to grow. The
region 1 s grain production, shows little sign of sustained growth, tfoeat
production In Iraq and the U.A.K. fluctuates widely. The U.A.R. follows a
policy of producing rice for export while meeting lta cereals deficit by
Imports of wheat. The U.A.R. is the area's only substantial producer of
maize and sorghum, and output has been virtually stationary.
The region Is expected to remain a net exporter of barley. Providing
production In Syria and Iraq is maintained, the liberalisation measures
20
TABLE 3
A.CM.: PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS IK CUSTOMS AND ALL OTHER DUTIES ON WHEAT
FLOUR AND GRAIN STARCH, ANNUAL AND CUMULATIVE, 1965-1971
Date of reduction
Percentage reductions
Annual Cumulative
1 January 1965
1 January 1966
1 January 1967
1 January 1968
I January 1969
1 January 1970
1 January 1971
1 July 1971
35
10
10
10
10
10
10
5
35
45
55
65
75
85
95
100
could promote aoae Interregional trad* in barley (and poaalbly alio malca)
to aeet the growing needs for livestock feed. Thar* la a large potential
import market for wheat, which la more competitive now that the U.A.R.
la buying U.S. wheat on commercial, rather than concessional, terms. The
region's ability to share In this trade, however, la severely limited by the
fact that for ecological reasons, exporters such aa Syria grow only durum
wheat, while the U.A.R. Imports predominantly bread wheats.
The United Kingdom Grain Market
Vhile the U.K. Is not considered part of a regional Integration system
a brief description of recent U.K. grain policy changes shows the spreading
Influence of E.E.C. grain policy.
21
The U.K. i« a significant cash market for U.S. grain and Imports 4
million tons of wheat, 4 million tons of maize, 0.5 million tons of barley
and 0.5 million tons of grain sorghums each year. Over 60a. of the market Is
supplied by the United States. During the last decade the U.K. has
Increased its domestic consumption and production of grain. Prior to 1964
foreign grain entered the U.K. at world prices and could be bought by farm-
era, millers and feed manufacturers at those prices. U.K. farmers sold
their grain at these world prices but were compensated through an unlimited
deficiency payment system.
In Spring 1964, the U.K. made a significant policy change to a minimum
Import price system similar to the E.S.C. system. The minimum import prices
24
were designated as follows:
£r±ln Dollars per bushel
wheat v 1.68 3/4 to jl.98 3/4
Corn SI.47
Barley $1.20
The U.K. government also Introduced a system of standard quantities
whereby the deficiency payments to U.K. farmers for grain production would
be limited.
The future of the U.K. market for U.S. grain will depend on U.K. entry
into the E.E.C. French policy on this issue opposes the development and
24
Scherta, L. P. and Koy L. Neeley, Barriers to the International
Grain Trade In Selected Countries. U.S. Dept. of Agric, foreign Agricul-
tural Service Report Ho. 126, p. 13, May, 1965.
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jst sources Indicate that while the French dominate the E.E.C., U.K. entry
25
will not be possible.
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Aabassade Da France, Press Service, Charles de Gaulle, British antrv
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. Paris, May 16, 1967.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY AGREEMENTS RELATING TO GRAIN
International coovaodity agreements can, in principle, be devised to
serve one of five objectives or a combination of them.
1. They can both raise producer prices by producer arrangements which
restrict production or exports.
2. They can promote economic stability by preventing undue price
fluctuations and quantities traded.
3. They can attempt to bring about long toru demand-supply adjust-
ments.
4. They can maintain markets for primary producing countries by
organization of wealthy Importers.
5. They can be used as Instruments of international commodity
programming for commercial and emergency food requirements.
The success or failure of International Commodity Agreements depends
on the member countries' abilities to bring world production and consumption
26
into balance. The big problem in the negotiation of International Commod-
ity Agreements is that negotiating countries are not sure which of the five
objectives they are aiming for.
The so-called Havana Charter serves as a code of guiding principles
Blau, G., International Commodity Arrangements and Policies F.A.O..
Commodity I'olicy Studies, No. 1, Rome, 1964.
governing International commodity negotiations which In essence states that
no country should be excluded from International negotiations and that
laportlng and exporting countries should have equal voting pover.
The International 'Vheat Agreement U.W.A.)
The International Wheat Agreement la an example of a multilateral
contract agreement. The original I.tf.A. of 1949 provided for about two-
thirds of world trade; the maximum price was then $1.80 per bushel and the
minimum price was stipulated to fall progressively from fl*M in the first
yeer to v 1.20 in the fourth and final year.
When the agreement was re-negotiated in 19S3 the exporting countries
ware successful in securing s rise in the stipulated maximum price to *2.05,
and of the stipulated minimum price to yl.35 throughout the subsequent three
year period. The U.K. and some other Importers withdrew at this juncture
and the proportion of the world trade covered by the agreement dropped to
25*. When the agreement was re-negotiated In 1939 the concept of guaranteed
quantities was abandoned and was replaced by an undertaking of member
importing countries to buy a minimum percent of their commercial require-
ments from member-exporting countries as long as prices moved within a
stipulated range. The exporters retain the obligation to sell et the maxi-
mum price, if called upon to do so by Importing countries, this is equal to
the annual average of importers' purchases over the previous four years
(less transactions already made within the agreement year). Tha latest
agreement signed in 1962 Is similar to the 1950 agreement. Minimum and
max imum prices ware raised to yl.62*; and ;>2.02i per bushel. The U.S.S.t.
Is a member of the current wheat agreement. A revised extension of the
agreement states that "the International wheat agreement, 1962 as extended
25
by the 1965 PROTOCOL shall continue In force between the parties to thia
PROTOCOL until 31 July 1967.
"
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During the time covered by the four agreements the significance of the
world price of wheat as a market force has been undermined because world
prices have basically been set through the collusion of America and Canada
and because exporters with mounting wheat supplies have been disposing of
increasing quantities in non commercial concessional outlets. The develop-
ment of the variable non quantitative import levy of the E.E.C. has further
emasculated the agreement. Another important factor is the increased use of
wheat as a feed grain and its relative aubstltutability for feed grains in
large European markets where wheat consumption is declining and feed grain
consumption is soaring.
Mr. Clarence Falaby openly criticizes the effectiveness of any inter-
national wheat agreement in helping the U.S. maintain or expand her share of
28
the E.E.C. market. He bases this on the following evidence.
(a) "The amount of wheat consumed by the alx la not materially
affected by the price level."
(b) "Wheat and feed grain production in the E.E.C. la related to
E.E.C. price."
(O "The quantity of feed gralna consumed by the E.E.C. is Inversely
related to the price level."
27
U.S. Dept. of State, Further Extension of International .Jheat Agree-
ment 1962. Article 1, Treatiea and Other International Acta, Series 6057,
1962.
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Palmby, C, Information Bulletin ^14-64
. U.S. Feed Grains Council,
Washington, D.C., August, 1964.
id) Palmby stresses E.E.C. price reduction rather than International
Grain Agreements.
International Grain Council
The proceedings and recommendations of the International Federation of
29
Agricultural Producers' C I. F.A.P.) 1966 annual meeting suggested the pos-
sibility of setting up an International Grain Council which would serve
Joint agreeaents on wheat and coarse feed grains. This is strongly opposed
30
by the U.S. Grain Trade. The I. P.A.P. stressed the growing interrelation
and increasing substitutablllty between the marketing and production of and
demand for wheat and feed grains and the Importance of stable feed grain
prices In the years ahead.
The I.F.A.P. conference also supported higher wheat prices in a new
international Vheat Agreement. It also supported Increased wheat production
specifically for food aid, the establishment of world wheat reserves for
emergencies and more advanced international systems of control over grain
production.
An International Feed Grains Agreement
The growing substitutablllty of wheat as a feed grain makes it impera-
tive to examine the world feed grain situation with special reference to
international commodity arrangements. International feed grain prices have
shown a gradual downward decline during the last ten years as world trade
29
Deleau, J., International federation of Agricultural Producers:
Proceedings of the 15th General Conference, London, England, 1966, p. 23.
30
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and production in feed grain showed a high rata of growth. There are tin
main reasons for tha application of an international commodity acheaa to
coarae grains.
(a) The need for structural adjustments In tha pattern of world
production and supply. This Is particularly true of Argentina
oats, South African maize and E.E.C. denatured wheat exports.
(b) The need to avoid short tarn price Instability in tha Interna-
tional coarse grain trade.
Only about 8i of world output of coarse grain goea Into International
trade compared to 28J for wheat.
The Food and Agriculture Organisation of tha United Nations In its
publication "The Stabilization of World Trade In Coarse Grains""1 outlines
three possible schemes whereby world trade In feed gralna might be stabi-
lized as to price and rationalized aa to production and supply. An inter-
national coarse grains arrangement would be tailored so that substitute
products should not be available on any large scale outside the agreement.
It would therefore have to cover a number of grain commodities which compete
with each other. It is more than likely that both Importers and exporters
would support any moves toward International price stability In coarae
gralna, but It would be most difficult to reconcile the long term and some-
times conflicting Interests of the Importing and exporting countries of the
International feed grains trade.
The f.A.O. study examines the feasibility of an International Coarae
Gralna Agreement from the point of view of (a) an export regulation scheme;
United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, Tha Stabiliza-
tion of forld Trade in Coarae Grains , p. 15, Rome, Italy, 1965.
(b) an international buffer stock; and (c) a multilateral contract agree-
In summary the F.A.O. would recommend an International feed grain*
agreement which would restrict the quantity of grain* cooing on the world
market and would maintain world price* at an agreed level. Thi* scheme
would be based on the relative magnitude of feed grain export* £roo each
country in a post datum period. The advantage of this flexible quota systea
is that it would enable the exporting countries to meet change* In world
demand without disastrous swing* In production. The major disadvantage of
this system is that It might perpetuate uneconomic high cost production and
prevent more efficient producer* from entering the market. Of course quota*
could be reviewed at regular Intervals. The F.A.O. atudy suggests that food
aid, humanitarian and concessional sale* to underdeveloped countrle* would
have to fall outside the program. Another disadvantage of Increased feed
grain price* would be that It might encourage marginal high coat producer*
to enter the International grain market. It might also favor the highly
developed countries and possibly damage the livestock and feed equilibrium
of the underdeveloped countries. It would also affect Increased world live-
*tock production.
The operation of a buffer stock in the coarse grains market would have
aimllar economic effect* to those concerning an export regulation scheme. A
buffer scheme might encourage increased production through higher prices and
could encourage substitution against coarse grain* by consumers.
The problems concerned with financing a buffer stock scheme are that
it would cost a lot of money and It would be difficult to distribute the
cost among member countrle*. Finally what specific instructions should be
29
given to the buffer stock manager regarding his Methods of market interven-
tion'. The selection of grades, prices and the final composition of the
buffer stock would also present problems.
A multilateral contract agreement does not specifically aim at main-
taining world prices at pra-determlned levels—exporters and importers agree
to sell and buy guaranteed quantities as guaranteed percentages of their
total trade in the commodity concerned at a stipulated maximum or minimum
price. To be effective the agreement should cover two-thirds of the total
trade of the participants.
The first problem regarding the application of a multilateral contract
system to an International Coarse Grain Agreement, Is that this agreement
should Include all varieties and grades which stipulate maximum and minimum
prices.
The second problem is that guaranteed quantities of Imports and
exports would have to be agreed upon by all member countries with respect
to the different grades of feed grains. The F.A.O. suggests that Import
members of a proposed International Grains Agreement may apply to be
relieved of their obligation to buy coarse grains in any year as part of
an action to safeguard its balance of payments position—a suggestion which
would automatically weaken the agreement.
Workable international agreements in grains are only possible with a
high percent participation of importers and exporters without escape
clauses, iiecause of increased substltutablllty it must cover wheat and feed
grains of all classes. These two factors are singularly lacking today. Any
workable grains arrangement requires a complete integration of humanitarian
food, concessional sales and commercial aales. It would seen that world
30
opinion is not yet strong enough to set up the necessary machinery to
administer such an agreement.
The U.K. grain Agreement and Guaranteed .Market Accessibility32
On April 15, 1964, and effective from that date, the U.K. Government
drew up an agreement with its suppliers concerning the U.K.'s future produc-
33tlon and trade policies relating to cereals. The objective of the agree-
ment was "a fair and reasonable balance between home production and
imports." The agreement set down Increased quantitative domestic produc-
tion targets in cereals in the U.K. and the legislative power to implement
them by price incentive. There was also a specific acknowledgment of the
need for "a better and more economic balance between world supply and
demand" and an assurance that the agreement would not prejudice the negotia-
tion of international cereals arrangements in a wider framework. At the
time the agreement was signed the United States lauded the agreement both
nationally and internationally. U.S. negotiations looked upon the market
accessibility guarantees given by Britain as a milestone in the history of
the international grain trade. Mr. Christian Hcrter looked upon the agree-
34
ment as a blue print for American market guarantees during the pending
G.A.T.T. negotiations with the E.E.C. The key issue in this agreement as
far as the U.S. was concerned was the stated guarantee by the U.K.
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government "to take effective action If grain imports fell below a three
year average." Hlatory baa shown that when imports did go below the three
year average in 1965-66 the U.K.. did not take the promised corrective
action. Ihia provea that the concept of guaranteed accessibility is most
difficult to guarantee and that the U.S. -U.K. agreement has suffered the
stigma of a "broken treaty."
rubuc u» w «»v mat H<j
During the first ten years the United States has exported vast amounts
of food aid under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954. From the start of U.S. F.L. 480 programs through January 1, 1965, the
U.S. exported 66 million metric tons of wheat under concessional programs
and 11 million tons of all other grain*. The market value of auch shipments
35in recent years has been running at about v 1.66 to jl.70 billion annually,
36
one-fourth of total U.S. agricultural exports. In October, 1966 new
legislation waa signed by President Johnson which will authorize continua-
tion of the Agricultural Trade and Development and Assistance Act of 1954 for
another two years (calendar years 1967 and 1968). Some significant policy
37
changes have been written into the new legislation and in the President's
Budget message to Congress on January 29, 1967. In referring to P.L. 480 it
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Annual Report "food for Peace"
(Public Law 480), 1965.
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Davis, J. H., U.S. Department of Agriculture, foreign Agricultural s
Service, iiciuorandum to Agricultural Attaches. Subject: hew Public Law 480
Programs.
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was evident that no substantial rise In direct food aid was anticipated by
the administration in (pita of the fact that tha Food for Peace Act of 1966
authorizes a considerable extension in financing of sales for both foreign
currency, credit and donations. One of the principal reasons for this la
that the Grain Advisory Committee of the U.S. Department of Agriculture has
agreed to reduce the U.S. wheat reserve frost 600 million bushels to 400
million bushels. The administration alma at maintaining the reserve level
steady during future years—a level which is well below wheat stocks of the
lata fifties and early sixties. 39
The following table shows the relative percent of concessional to com-
mercial aales during 1965.
TABLE 4
P.L. 480 EXPORTS AND COMMERCIAL SALES OF
U.S. WHEAT AND CORN, 1965
Type of export .-.heat Corn
P.L. 460 exports
Co—srclal aales
Total exports
P.L. 480 exports as % of
total exports
(nilllon bushels)
479 48
-241- _360_
720 609
67 J 81
Source: Food for Peace 1965 Annual Report on P.L. 480, U.S. Dept.
of Agrlc.
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Report on President's Budget Speech, Southwestern Millar , p. 40,
January 31, 1967.
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The administration plans to export approximately 535,000,000 bushels
of wheat during 1967-68 under F.L. 480 which Is not much more than the
531,000,000 shipped during 1965-66 (cereal year). It Is expected that grain
sorghum shipments will be reduced from 96,000,000 bushels during 1966-67 to
64,000,000 bushels during 1967-68.
The President recently spelled out the new criteria for qualification
40
in P.L. 480 programs. In summary these will:
1. Require more effective self-help measures by recipient countries
as a condition for U.S. food aid.
2. Increase the amount of assistance for the key sectors of agricul-
ture, health and education.
3. Support regional arrangements and make greater use of multilateral
channels through which other nations cooperatively share the costs
of economic development.
4. Encourage greater participation by private enterprise in the
development process.
5. Concentrate aid In those countries where successful development
is most profitable.
The following are the major points of change apoclflcally mentioned
in the new Public Law 480 program.
Aid must be accompanied by a uajor effort on the part of those who
receive it. To qualify for U.S. food aid, countries oust be trying con-
scientiously to provide more and more of their own food requirements from
their own resources and their own efforts.
40
"No Substantial Rise Planned for P.L. 480,"
40, January 31, 1967.
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Food aid shipment* will be thoas commodities that are 'available,'
rather than those that are in "oversupply." World requirements will be
included in U.S. agricultural production planning, along with domestic
requirements , to aasura such availability.
The new program seta a goal of countries now buying U.S. fans products
with their local currencies to buy for dollars, or with dollar credits, by
the and of 1971.
Aa in the past, the program's concessional sales agreements will be
made only to countries deemed friendly to the U.S. Countries controlled or
dominated by the world Communist movement are excluded from such agreements.
Also excluded are countries that do business with Cuba or North Vietnam
—
except that the President (when in the national interest) may authorize
sales agreements with countries that export to Cuba such item* as medical
supplies, and non-strategic agricultural or food supplies and must Inform
the Congress of his reasons for making the exception.
Stress will be placed, particularly in donation programs, on foods for
children that meet their requirements of protein, minerals, and vitamins.
Under the Food for Freedom approach, food assistance to meet current
needs and technical assistance to help a country better take care of Its
future needs will be closely related. Where countries show willingness to
give high priority to food production improvement, the U.S. will reinforce
such self-help efforts with support from U.S.D.A., Land-Grant Universities
and private agricultural resources.
The new program emphasizes that the world food problem is increasing
at such a rate that as many countries as possible must contribute their
products, services, and talents in finding solutions.
35
The new program also authorizes on a request basis the use of foreign
currencies from export sales in support of programs of family planning.
Realignments are made in the program titles: Title 1 authorizes both
the sale of U.S. farm products for local currencies and the sale for dollars
on credit terms (formerly Title IV).
Title 11 authorises food donations, both government-to-government
basis and through voluntary organizations.
Title 111 authorizes barter of U.S. farm products for materials and
services from other countries.
Title IV stipulates that the program will be used to help those
friendly countries that seriously try to cope with their own problems of
food and population.
The new P.L. 480 proposals are due to mounting criticism of the tradi-
tional food aid shipments which tended to Increase population in countries
short of food and make them more dependent on foreign food aid. The net
effects of foreign food aid then were short-term. The emphasis In the new
food aid program is on self-help, through increased technical aid and the
use of food aid for labor payments, in the planning and development of
irrigation systems, dams and hydroelectric plants. The accumulation of vast
quantities of U.S. funds in national currencies of the recipient countries
suffered severe criticism when India devalued the rupee by 40 percent. This
meant that U.S. foreign assets in India where they are relatively large
dropped by 40 percent in value overnight. Similar action In other recipient
41
countries have reduced U.S. foreign assets.
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Widener, A., "Paving Hunger with Good Intentions," Hunan events , p. /
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The United States government i» now strongly praising other countries
to torn a multilateral consortium which would specifically donate food to
India. World discussion and opinion is forming a new dimension in this
respect. The Indian crisis during the early part of 1967 prompted President
Johnson to donate another 2 million tons of grain to Indian food relief on
42
February 4.
While the administration is now emphasizing the self-sufficiency
approach to world food aid, it is also becoming more concerned about the
future food prospects of the world. Undersecretary of Agriculture John A.
Schnittkar made this plain last October when he said, "The food deficit of
the less developed world is widening rapidly, large grain crops this year
around the world should not obscure the fact that world food consumption has
43
exceeded production for the past five years."
Public Law 480 and Commercial Sales
P.L. 480 has initiated new developing countries in the uses of U.S.
grains and in soma cases this has led to the development of new commercial
markets for U.S. grains. Many market development activities are now
financied by S .L. 480 funds and for this reason a close appraisal of the
role of P.L. 480 and commercial sales is required. Market development can-
not be effective unless the developing agency has ownership of the commodity.
It is for this reason that a pilot government agency should be considered
42
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which would attempt to develop new market* by direct sales abroad. This
agency could operate within the framework of a recognized Commodity Credit
Corporation.
U.S. millers and grain processors should be allowed to benefit froa
P.L. 480 Insofar as this is possible. The increased use of flour and
bulgar in P.L. 480 would help the U.S. milling industry and would alto be
more convenient to the recipient country. Mr. Gordon 3oals, Export Secre-
tary of the Millers National Federation and Representative Robert Dole in
44
Kansas have stressed the mutual advantages of this policy many times.
v*lle P.L. 480 legislation nay improve the efficiency and utilization
of U.S. food aid, no major improvement is likely unless (a) the U.S. grain
export system is rationalized, and (b) world grain producing countries form
a vigorous and working international grain council. Both points are
unlikely to be fulfilled.
Under the terms of the new three year agreement negotiated in May,
1967, 4.5 million metric tons of grain will be diverted to food aid by the
developed countries of the world. Of the total the United States will
provide 1.9 million tons or 42%. About the same amount will be provided by
the Importing countries, including the European Economic Coossunlty which
45has agreed to contribute one million tons.
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at P.L. 480, have not Interfered greatly with the commercial grain trade
pattern* of the United States or third country exporters. Also, there is
evidence that they hava not depressed world pricea for wheat and feed
grains. Schultz has made the point that concessional sales have actually
prevented a complete collapse in world grain pricea by diverting surplus
from coonercial markets.'-
47
furthermore—an O.E.C.D. study Indicated that "a large part of the
wheat and wheat flour sent on concessional terms to underdeveloped regions
has represented "additional consumption" While total U.S. concessional
sales in grain Increased from 8.4 million metric tons in 1955-56 to 13.8
million metric tons in 1964, commercial aales in this category increased
from 6.5 million metric tons in 1955-56 to 27.9 million metric tons in 1964.
Meanwhile total world grain trade increased from 47.7 million metric tons in
1955-56 to 94.6 million metric tons in 1964 and under theae conditions P.L.
480 sales stimulated Increased expansion of immediate commercial markets and
acted as a positive catalyst to international economic development.
47 Organisation for European Cooperation and Development, Food Aid
Ita tola In Economic Development , p. 52, Paris, 1964.
CHAPTER HI
WORLD GRAIN PLANNING AND THE KENNEDY ROUND OF C.A.T.T.
World grain policy waiters have been decidedly active during the last
eighteen months. This resulted from (a) a growing world opinion which is
sharply In favor of a major multilateral food aid program to feed the under-
developed countries of the world; (b) the reduction in world wheat stocks;
(e) the Increase in world wheat trade and production and finally, the
general feeling of dissatisfaction on the part of the wheat exporting
countries of the world with the existing International Wheat Agreement have
all combined to turn traditional international wheat policies Inside out.
There is also evidence for the fact that there was strong institutional
pressure from F.A.O., U.S.D.A., l.F.A.F. and the E.E.C. to link both feed
and food grain in one International grain agreement. The U.S. -E.E.C.
negotiations within the framework of G.A.T.T. brought things to a climax.
In January, the United States took the initiative and in so doing put
forward four principal points upon which she would be willing to base a new
three-year world wheat and grains agreement. These points are:
1. Improved accessibility to importer markets.
2. Improved export earnings through remunerative world prices.
3. Participation by all exporters In managing supplies for commercial
markets ("supply management").
4. Participation in food aid by exporters and importers alike.
These four points form the most comprehensive International grain proposals
39
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ever conceived and proposed, for, if fully agreed to, a new graina agreement
Mould mean accord on two additional polnta: (a) That feed graina and wheat
would be combined under one agreement, lb) That auch an agreaoant could
only be administered by a vary strong international grain agency. The U.S.
proposals formed praiseworthy goals to which International grain negotia-
tions could aim. Aa the May grains agreaoant of G.A.T.T. showed, only
points two and four were agreed on and feed graina waa excluded from the
agreement.
The Origin of the New Proposals
It is interesting to trace the origin of the new U.S. proposal. The
following brief note on the genesis of these proposals seems to Indicate that
they originated In France.
The moat notable waa the Plaanl-Baumgartner Plan which the French
Government proposed in 1961. The plan recommended (a) a price increase In
cooraercially traded grain, (b) International supply management by production
control, and (e) multilateral food aid based on surplus production.
In 1963 the Mansholt proposals ware put forward by the E.E.C., these
recommended the binding and fraexlng of international grain support levels.
It Included international quotas for production, commercial exports, food
aid baaed on world reference and world market prices.
The lataat European proposal waa that of Mr. M. J. Lequertler,
Director of French Grain Coops. Ha recommended a world grain price Increase,
an International food aid program and the formation of a new international
grains council to administer world grain flow.
It is intareatlng to note the similarity of the January, 1967 U.S.
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proposals »t the G.A.T.T. negotiations and it is ironic to relate that it
was the European negotiators who could not agree to two of their own
original proposals—supply management and Import quotas or market accessi-
bility.
U.S. Position
The present U.S. administration was said to be determined not to
repeat certain mistakes, such as oversupplys inflexible acreage allotments;
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and non-competitive export pricing. The U.S. administration was also
emphasizing a farm policy that is foreign trade oriented. In drawing out
the four points outlined above, three central issues seemed to underlie U.S.
international grain policy.
1. More remunerative grain prices through the Kennedy Round of
G.A.T.T.
2. Improved market development possibilities.
3. Food aid and world economic development.
The deadline for completion of the Kennedy Round was June 30, 1967.
The cereals negotiations were one of the main issues and the negotiating
countries were Australia, Argentina, the E.E.C., the U.K., Japan, Switzer-
land, and Norway, the countries which make up the G.A.T.T. cereals group.
The increasing protective nature of E.E.C. and U.K. grain production
policies is encouraging domestic production and reducing the traditional
export markets of the world's major grain producers. Since the E.E.C. and
Schnittker, J. A., Undersecretary of Agriculture, "The Kennedy
Round: Three years of Trade," foreign Agriculture. Vol. 5, No. 23, p. 3,
June A, 1967.
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the U.K. together import one-third of the world's commercially traded grain
their future policies are important as far aa the U.S. is concerned.
The U.S. and other major exporters Bought a guarantee that their
traditional markets would be maintained and in some cases with a growth
factor.
Objections to the Grain Agreement Proposal
The U.S. preconditions as set out by U.S.D.A. officials did not go
unnoticed. The Grain and Feed Dealers National Association (G. F.D.N.A.) and
the U.S. Feed Grains Council strongly criticized the new U.S. proposals for
an International Grains Arrangement. In a shortly worded position paper the
association stated that the new proposals contradict the basic U.S. trade
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policy objectives which ware trade liberalization. Referring to the pro-
posed price Increase the statement says 'The proposed revision of present
arrangements governing international trade in wheat reflects an alien trade
philosophy. It would suspend competition among wheat producing countries,
encourage the growth of less efficient wheat production by increasing price
Incentives on a world-wide basis, and when supplies exceed commercial
demand, it would allocate markets among exporters on a basis unrelated to
marketing and production efficiency."
The Association was critical of the U.S. approach which emphasized
accessibility to traditional markets based on historical grounds. It
stated that the basis for U.S. negotiations should be economic specializa-
tion and comparative advantage.
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U.S. Congress, 87th Congress, 2nd Session,
Public Law 67-794, October 11, 1962.
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Referring to the proposed price increeae the association says that a
ore restrictive pricing policy is "likely to deprive the U.S. of the
flexibility needed to assure a share of the world's commercial wheat market
which reflects our growing efficiency." It is also pointed out that
Increased world prices for wheat would not help the U.S. wheat grower and
would damage the growth of commercial wheat markets in the most advanced
less developed countries, such as Brazil. Regardless of any grain agree-
ment, it is reasonable to assume that a rise in wheat prices is likely to
encourage increased wheat production in deficit countries. A price Increase
would encourage Increased E.E.C. and possible pirate dumping into the Inter-
national wheat market.
The Association states that Improved wheat crops in Russia and Eastern
Europe indicate that the world has adequate capacity to Increase production
at present prices.
Other objections were that world wheat price increase would be unfair
to Japan which has been encouraged to consume large quantities of U.S.
wheat, and that U.S. balance of payments might suffer if wheat aales declined
due to a price hike.
The G.F.D.N.A. further states that the U.S. proposal should aim at
preventing higher Internal price guarantees in the European markets—an
objective which is virtually politically impossible at thla time. Similarly,
the U.S. demand for grain production controls in Europe similar to U.S.
controls Is deemed virtually Impossible.
The E.E.C. offered to put a ceiling on present high production incen-
tives with no guarantee aa to the sice or velue of Its future grain require-
ments. The E.E.C. also came forward with a "self sufficiency" concept that
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has bean Incorporated into the proposal advanced by exporting countries as a
means of assuring access. The vital point of this proposal was that import-
ing countries mould aalntain their total imports of wheat and feed grains at
given percentages of domestic consumption. Any grain produced above the
negotiated level of self-sufficiency would be stored or exported as food
aid. The E.E.C. was willing to give 10% of its market to imports—a figure
which was unacceptable to the U.S.
* ftaniTY fff r \t1 CA.T.T. Grain Negotiations
As the negotiations hardened in February, bargaining emphasis and
attention focused on wheat. The U.S. grain trade and the E.E.C. forced
negotiators to abandon talks which would include wheat and feed grain In one
agreement
. U.S. negotiators did however press for guaranteed accessibility
for feed grain but without success.
The U.S. along with other world wheat exporting countries maintained
that present world wheat prices were far from adequate. At present the
minimum world trading price for wheat under the I.w.A. Is equivalent to
SI.05 to SI. IS for ordinary quality wheat at farm gate prices In the Great
Plains. Today's minimum world trading price would return only SI. 45 to
$1.55 per bushel for the same U.S. wheat. American negotiators demanded a
world price hike of 40 cents a bushel or more over the minimum of the
existing International Wheat Agreement. This proposal waa strongly sup-
ported by all wheat exporters and attacked by importers. The new agreement
would also alter the basic grade and grading point on world wheat trade from
no. 1 Manitoba stored in Fort William and Fort Arthur, Canada, to no. 2 herd
Red Winter, basis f.o.b. the Gulf. In addition a specific schedule of
quality differentials is proposed. Many American officials felt that the
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United States has been "holding the price umbrella' for wheat on the Inter-
national market through the old I.W.A. for too long. U.S. official* were
also anxious to develop "a new system for effectively sharing the burden of
managing commercial marketings of wheat so that minimum prices can be main-
tained."50
U.S. policy makers also felt that America waa carrying an excessive
burden of world food aid, and that all affluent countries should systemati-
cally program a certain percentage of their production capacity to fulfill
world food aid needs. It is believed that the U.S. has strong support from
Canada, France, U.K., and Australia with regard to this particular proposal.
The E.E.C. proposed (a) a calf-sufficiency index which was so high
that agreement to it would be absolutely meaningless In terms of U.S. trade
and (b) further unilateral adjustments of the self-sufficiency index to take
into account special conditions. Accessibility for a given percent of the
E.E.C. and U.K. markets was in fact Impossible to negotiate at any price.
It is known that Australia and Canada did not press the accessibility Issue
aa strongly as the U.S. which further reduced the U.S. chance of success.
Also the E.E.C. is now likely to be an exporting market in terras of wheat
regardless of accessibility.
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Schnittker, J. K. , Undersecretary of Agriculture, Address . National
Association of wheat Growers, Seattle, Washington, January 16, 1967.
CHAPTER IV
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL CEREALS ARRANGEMENT
During the development of this report it has been impossible to avoid
mentioning the results of the new international grain arrangement negotiated
after the long and arduous C.A.T.T. grain negotiations.
The negotiations were tedious and frustrating. The goals of import-
ing snd exporting countries did not always coincide. Nevertheless, all
major grain trading countries were willing to agree that world grain policy
centered around two basic problems.
1. The problem of rationalising and stabilizing the International
commercial grain trade.
2. The problem of distributing food surplus and food aid to under-
developed countries.
!<hile the C.A.T.T. negotiations on grain Included Japan, the U.K. and
the E.E.C. as the principal grain importers and the U.S., Canada and
Australia as the principal exporters It is true to say that in May the
negotiations developed Into a direct bargaining dialogue between the U.S.
and the E.E.C.
With this in mind a summary of the major points of the agreement are
as follows:
The new agreement will replace the International :*heat Agreement which
expires on July 31, 1967, and will last for a period of three years.
The world grains agreement of 1967 which emerged from the G.A.T.T.
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negotiation suffered a painful delivery. The new agreement has two
principal features.
1. An increased minimum international wheat price of $1.73 per
bushel.
2. A multilateral food aid program of 4.5 million tons of grain.
U.S. and E.E.C. negotiations failed to come to any agreement on:
1. Guaranteed accessibility.
2. International supply management.
Under the new agreement the basic grade and passing point in the world
wheat trade has been changed from No. 1 Manitoba basis Fort William and Port
Arthur to No. 2 Hard Red Winter basis f.o.b. the Gulf of Mexico.
Gralp Prices
the pricing provisions of the new grain accord establish a world floor
price of $1.73 a bushel and a maximum of $2.13 per bushel for U.S. No. 2
Hard Red Winter, ordinary protein, f.o.b. U.S. ports on the Gulf of Mexico,
for U.S. wheats, the new minimum prices are generally about 23 cents a
bushel higher than the minimum under the old International Uheat Agreement,
which will run through July 31, 1967. The U.S. originally asked for a price
increase of 40 cents. Minimum prices for other major wheats are set accord-
ing to differences in quality and location.
Maximum prices for the world wheat trade have been set at 40 cents
above the minimum for each wheat. This provides a 40 cent range in which
prices may fluctuate in line with supply and demand. If prices reach a
maximum level, exporters will provide agreed quantities to importers at not
mora than the agreed maximum prices.
It is understood that these new prices will be administered by the
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international Wheat Council which enforces price discipline by consultation.
Under the new arrangement a schedule of minimum and maximum price* for
ten najor types of wheat ha* bean set up. They are quoted a* follow* in
U.S. dollars f.o.b. basis the Gulf.
Minima ajgaaja)
Canada-
No. 1 Manitoba *1.95* »2.35%
No. 3 Manitoba 1.90 2.30
United States-
No. 1 dark northern spring, 142 1.83 2.23
No. 2 hard winter, ordinary 1.73 2.13
No. 1 western white 1.68 2.08
No. 1 soft red winter 1.60 2.00
Argentina
—
Plate 1.73 2.13
Australia—
F.a.q. 1.66 2.08
European Common Market
—
Standard 1.50 1.90
Sweden 1.50 1.90
"Minimum and maximum price* f.o.b. U.S. Meat coast port* are all 6c
per bu. below the Gulf price*."
"Based on current ocean freight rates, the following factors may be
used to adjust the Gulf minimum* to the equivalent price at ports from which
various wheats are actually exported:"
Cent* above or below Gulf
Canada, f.o.b. St. Lawrence 1.3
Canada, in store Lakahead -14.5
West Australia, f.o.b. - 2.5
East Australia, f.o.b. - 6.5
Argentina, f.o.b. to U.K. -12.0
France, f.o.b. to U.K. *16.0
Sweden, f.o.b. to U.K. • 8.0
"'World Minimum on 10 Major Wheats," Sfluthwaitfltn Miliar, Vol. 46.
No. 12, p. 25, May 23, 1967.
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Under the new grains arrangement 4.5 million ton* of food aid has been
committed by the participating countriaa on a multilateral basis. This
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falls snort of the 10 million tons originally requested by the U.S.
"Under the multilateral food aid section of the new arrangement,
preliminary commitments cover 94.6.. or the 4,500,000-ton annual food aid
program. The balance is expected to be obtained from countries that will be
brought into the pact in the last-minute negotiations, which clearly indi-
cates a desire for Russia to become a member."
"While the food aid is expected to be mainly wheat, it is Indicated
that the terms of the arrangement will permit shipments of coarse grains if
the donor and recipient countries agree."
"Following is a list of the annual pledges made to the 4,500,000-ton
food aid program in percent of the total and In tons:"
U.S.
Canada
Australia
Argentina
E.E.C.
U.K.
Switzerland
Sweden
Denmark
Norway
Finland
Japan
Total
While 4.5 million tons of food aid does seem large it is worth men-
tioning that the U.S. alone exports some 16 million tons of grain on a
^rcent flfftrlc tpns
42.0 1,890,000
11.0 495,000
5.0 225,000
0.5 23,000
23.0 1,035,000
5.0 225,000
0.7 32,000
1.2 54,000
0.6 27,000
0.3 14,000
0.3 14,000
u. StfS.OOO
94.0 4,259,000
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lbld .. p. 37.
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non-commercial basis annually. It 1* understood that the new food program
will not altar present U.S. P.L. 480 commitments and that the two programs
will be handled separately.
Guaranteed Market Accessibility
it Is Interesting to note that it was the E.E.C. countries that
originally suggested some form of self sufficiency quotas during 1966 and
again during the G.A.T.T. negotiations of early 1967. The issue of guaran-
teed accessibility to the E.E.C. grain market was understandably crucial to
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the U.S. Since E.E.C. officials admitted that the Six was 86,. self suf-
ficient in grains, hopes were high that some agreement would result. As we
now know E.E.C. overtures regarding accessibility guarantees were idealistic
platitudes, and the U.S. had to abandon this subject in order to save the
negotiations.
There is no doubt that the loss of guaranteed accessibility was a very
grave one for U.S. grain exports to that region. The quantity of U.S. grain
exported to this area is now completely in the hands of the E.E.C. authori-
ties.
Supply IBM—I
The E.E.C. and particularly France has had some proposals regarding
supply management. The Schnittker proposals of January, 1967, showed that
the U.S. would be more than glad to comply with such a program since the
U.S. was in fact already doing so. The supply management feature was
53
Journal of Commerce. April 19, 1967.
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abandoned In February aa being "administratively impossible." Supply
management turned out to be a olid embarrassment to U.S. negotiators because
it would mean tying wheat and feed grains Into one price and quota structure
In a comprehensive grains agreement. The U.S. feed grain lobby violently
opposed the move so the U.S. played the proposal down even though the E.S.C.
authorities were keen to support it because of the increased substitution of
wheat for animal feed.
fctsUM
The new multilateral food aid grain pact of 4.5 million metric tons is
just over 23.. of the total annual U.S. concessional grain sales of 16 million
tons. It does however Include feed grains and wheat and it will have one
Important effect of creating a market vacuum In net grain Importing coun-
tries such as the U.K., E.E.C. and other slgnees (see Table above) who will
export given quantities annually. Schnlttker made the point that this
will mean a market opportunity of 2.5 million tons of grain, 2 million tons
of wheat and 5 million tons of feed grain for the U.S.
The second aspect of the food aid pact is that it Is a milestone in
multilateral food aid. It means that other developed countries no longer
look to the U.S. aa the sole giver to hungry nations, and that In the future
all food aid will be on a multilateral basis. This brings us closer to the
day when government will produce grain especially for food aid. It also
^G.A.T.T. News Bulletin, XVII, p. 4, para. 2, February 27, 1967.
Schnlttker, J. A., Undersecretary of Agriculture, "The Kennedy
Round: Three Years of Trade," Foreign Agriculture . Vol. 5, No. 23, June 5,
1967, p. 3.
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aaans that • developing countries grow the U.S. will be able to expand its
commercial sales and exports.
Faults of the New Arrangement
As far as the U.S. Is concerned the new arrangement has three princi-
pal faults. These are:
1. No access guarantee to traditional U.S. grain markets. The
volume of U.S. exports to Europe is completely at discretion of
K.E.C. and other European countries. In fact the U.S. has
no guarantee of future access to any share of any European market.
2. As far aa price is concerned the U.S. has no improved price
advantage in the E.E.C. in either feed grains or wheat. Future
U.S. grain negotiations with the E.E.C. should aim specifically
at reduction of the common E.E.C. target price.
3. It would seem that the attention of U.S. negotiators was focused
entirely on U.S. wheat exports to the E.E.C. This was a major
tactical error since the U.S. exports feed grains to that area
are already ouch greater than wheat and offer a much greater
potential for future expansion. (Total feed grain market is 8
million tons, U.S. share 4 million. Total wheat market Is 4
million tons, U.S. share 1 million.)
4. The United States failed to obtain any "supply management" com-
mitment from any of the C.A.T.T. cereal committee members.
International supply management is a vital prerequisite to any
long lasting and workable international grain arrangement.
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Tha Effect* of tha Now Arrangement on U.S. Grain Exports
The new grains arrangement Is a compromise with advantages and dis-
advantages for the U.S. In the area of price the level of 11.73 per bushel
would have no lamed late advantage for the U.S. since in June 15 of 1967
European Importers were paying over v 1.83 per bushel for Hard Red Winter
i.o.b. the Gulf. During the three-year period it is likely that world wheat
production will Increase and under these circumstances the new minimum
will be a significant price support. It is likely that the U.S. subsidy
payments on wheat will be reduced as a result of the new price increase.
The grade change from Manitoba to Hard Red Winter will focus world
attention on this wheat and this is likely to be a useful aid in market
development.
Reliable sources estimate that the new pact will bring national
average prices for U.S. wheat from ,1.38 during the laat three years to
between v 1.48 and y 1.63 par bushel during the coming three years.
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Trade sources indicate that the new price arrangements will not have
any immediate expansionary effect on the commercial market of U.S. wheat
overseas. It will however place U.S. wheat in a more competitive position
price-wise in markets where tha sole competitor is Canada. It does help the
U.S. operate a more competitive and flexible pricing system.
Food and Agriculture Organization of U.N., "Long Term Development
in Wheat and Coarse Grain Situation," Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural
Economics and Statistics. Vol. 15, January, 1966, pp. 11, 12.
Schnlttker, J. A., Undersecretary of Agriculture, Press Report,
Southwestern Miller. Vol. 46, Mo. 12, May 23, 1967, p. 25.
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Conversation with Official of Louis Dreyfus Corp., Minneapolis
Grain Exchange, May 25, 1967.
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Dr. John Schnittker state* that world trading prices for wheat will
be 10-25 cent* per bushel higher than during the last three years as a
result of the agreement. He further states that the new I.tf.A. minimum*
will be an additional price Insurance for farmers. (See Table 16, p. 15,
Wheat Price, Agricultural Statistics, 1966, U.S.D.A.)
A brief examination of U.S. and E.E.C. price structure shows that the
new price increase does not have any significance at this time as far as
U.S. export price and sales volume are concerned.
The U.S. loan rate price for No. 2 Hard Red Winter 14Z protein in St.
Louis was 1.48 cents on June 8, 1967. The actual market cash price on the
saaa day in St. Louis varied between 173 to 178 cents per bushel. If this
wheat waa exported from the Gulf it would qualify for an export subsidy of
8 cents a bushel on June 8. Transport costs from St. Louis to the Gulf are
estimated at 10 cents a bushel. This would mean that the world price on a
ship loaded in the Gulf would be somewhere between 191 and 196 cents a
bushel for No. 2 Hard Red Winter ordinary protein (142).
Shipping costs to Europe would cost another ten cent* a bushel which
would bring the price to between $2.01 and ,.2.06 a bushel. How, it Is
estimated that the E.E.C. target price for Hard Red Winter wheat will be
*3.34 a bushel ($120 per metric ton) July 1, 1967. Therefore including port
charges of 10 cents a bushel U.S. Hard Red Winter wheat will cost between
$2.11 and $2.16 in, say Rotterdam. If the wheat moves into the Common
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2tt. clt .. Ref. 55 above.
^U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Grain Market News. Vol. 15, Mo. 23, pp.
2-3, June 9, 1967.
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Market: It will pay an approximate E.E.C. levy of between $1.18 and $1.22 per
bushel. The following tabulation sketches the price rise as the grain moves
Into European trade.
The following example illustrates the Increasing price of wheat as it
moves from the U.S. to the E.E.C. market:
Date: June 8, 1967
Grain: Hard Red Winter 14.0 Protein
Location: St. Louis, Missouri
Loan Rate: $1.48 per bushel
Cumulative price
rap&eCost factors
(dollars per bushel
1.73-1.78 cents per
bushel
.08 M It
.10 II II
.10 II II
.10 II II
1.18-1.22
MARKET CASH PRICE
EXPORT SUBSIDY gulf jUne 8th " " 1.81 — 1.86
TRANSPORT COST St. Louis - Gulf " " 1.91 — 1.96
SHIPPING COSTS " " 2.01 — 2.06
PORT CHARGE ROTTERDAM " " 2.11 — 2.16
APPROXIMATE E.E.C. IMPORT LEVY
and INTERNAL MARKET COSTS 3.29 — 3.38
ESTIMATED E.E.C. TARCET PRICE 3.34
It la evident then from the above price analysis that the new price
Increase will not have any major effect on U.S. shipments to the E.E.C.
It Is evident also that the E.E.C. will collect less levy money at present
target levels. Of course there is no guarantee that the E.E.C. will not
increase their target levels, If (a) world prices Increase, and (b) if she
imports higher costing quality wheat.
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Trade sources indicate that tbe new price increase nay encourage
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increased E.E.C. exports but will not have a direct effect on production.
61
Xrade Sources, Conversation with Officials of threat trains ijheat
Inc .. iJashington, D.C., February 4, 1967.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Political forces and International Grain Policy
Since World Mar II there has been a definite Increase in the trade
restriction and barriers to free International movement in grain. A coun-
try with a comparative advantage in grain production can no longer be sure
of an outlet for that grain regardless of price or quality. The essential
reasons for this are:
1. Stronger policies towards self sufficiency in traditional grain
importing countries caused by the political pressure of domestic
farmers, and the economic pressure of diminishing foreign exchange
reserves.
2. The grovlng Importance of regional integration in international
trade.
3. The increased role of national governments and international
Institutions in the world grain trade.
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Ubrld grain production is likely to Increase substantially by 1970.
tor this reason there is an obvious need for rationalization of the world
commercial grain trade and world food aid programs.
An honest and realistic look at the world grain trade today suggests a
62
Pood and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Agricul-
tural Coamodlties Projections for 1970. Supplement E/en. 13/48, CCP 62/15,
Section II, Table 1, Rome, Italy, 1962.
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picture of intense national and International political activity of a prag-
matic nature on one hand mixed with a growing aenae of international ldeal-
laa and altrulaa on the other. Thle eltuatlon makes analyala vary difficult
because countries combine national Interests where they coincide and take
opposite positions where they disagree. National preaauraa by high coat
domestic producers In reality take precedence over International idealism
purely on a political basis. International trade la increasingly hampered
by the protection which reaults from the political force of these producers.
International trade la further hampered by the Ideological differences
between Russia, China, and the United Statea. Above ell, national economic
interest la the prime objective of the International trade negotiator. This
waa Increasingly confused by the repeated idealistic aaaertlona of Franca,
Canada, Australia, the United Statea and Britain to form an International
Grains Agreement which It la aald would solve two basic problems.
a. Rationalise and stabilise the International Grain Trade.
b. Distribute food surplus and food aid to needy underdeveloped
countrlea.
The prime movers In the suggestiona above ere idealistic civil ser-
vants, diplomats. International fans leaders, intellectuals and politicians.
They are aware and sensitive to the growing world opinion created by U.S.
food aid and mass communication which aaea no rationality In starvation and
malnutrition when the capacity for rich countrlaa to produce food surplus
exists. They are also aware of the growing trade in world grain and the
opportunity that their nations and their farmers may reap In growing share
of thia Increasing trade. While theae negotiations have much to recommend
them they have one major draw-back—they are far from being realistic. High
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ideal* are always laudable but they art worthies! unless they are related to
reality. The overture* and pre-negotiatlon* surrounding the Kennedy round
of G.A.T.T. grain negotiations were worthwhile but had three weak point*
which ware:
(a) That the participant* have not done enough domestic preliminary
ground work regarding their own policies and objectives.
(b) That the sense of urgency damaged the quality and scope of the
agreement—as far a* the U.S. was concerned.
(c) That there i* at present no administrative international
machinery which could administer a comprehensive agreement.
It would seen that there are four principal force* at work in the
International Grain Trade today. They are:
(a) Demands of domestic grain producer*.
(b) Policies of National Governments.
(e> National and International Commercial grain trade.
(d) Intellectual pressure, internationalism, and world opinion.
Domestic producer* demand high grain prices and protection from the
cheapest foreign grain imports of other countries. They force government*
by political pressure to build protective barrier* which hinder interna-
tional trade in grain.
Governments are most susceptible to domestic interests and while there
1* a growing pandering to international lam In reality the domestic Interest
dominate*.
The modus Vivendi of the national and international grain trade is
profit maximization. Its leaders are to be commended for their outstanding
tactical ability in the field of public relation* with the producer and the
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government. The skill of the grain trade ia such that while It plays a aoat
powerful role In the national and international trad* It plays down this
power in public and rarely clashes openly with government or producer asso-
ciations. The grain trade increases its power and wealth by its maneuver-
ability in a confused situation. It finances, insures, and ships grain froa
source to consumer with outstanding entreprenaurshlp and quiet efficiency.
It is the real power center on the international grain scene. Governments
st the International negotiating table seem to forget the power of the trade.
Any workable International grains agreement must have much more llasion with
and participation of the world's large grain merchandisers.
Vbrld opinion is the most hopeful growing force which will aid the
international grain negotiations particularly from the world food aid point
of view. Since It la a dynamic force it is a most hopeful element—but the
essential question is how long will it take world opinion to be strong enough
to force the international policy which gives global benefits over the
national policy of "charity begins at home." The United States must be
given credit for taking the initiative here. U.S. International policy on
food aid was based on abundant grain aupply—but today these supplies no
longer exist and world opinion and Its International institutions are
frantically trying to fill the approaching vacuum, In order to prevent the
collapse of the International food aid program of the future.
The United States Competitive Poaltlon in Vbrld Grain Trade
The United Stetea government and the U.S. agricultural Industry are
committed to a policy of expanding U.S. commercial grain exports. It would
seem that the future competitive position of U.S. grains In the world market
will depend on the following points:
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1. Flexible domestic production policies which result in adequate
supplies for domestic and export markets.
2. The nature, scope, and structure of future U.S. export systems.
3. A flexible and adaptable export pricing policy.
4. The nature, scope, and administration of future international
grains agreements.
Wheat
Under the present circumstances, the U.S. is well established In the
commercial feed grain market of the world but seems to be in a weaker posi-
tion in the international market for commercial wheat where the long estab-
lished and co-ordinated export programs of Canada and Auatralia limit the
sales of U.S. wheat.
The U.S. wheat Industry has some built-in structural disadvantages.
It produces a greater range of wheat types over a wide geographical area.
Traditionally the U.S. has exported a relatively low percentage of its total
production and for this reason it is only in recent years that the industry
has become export "conscious." A brief examination of the efforts to expand
U.S. commercial marketing of wheat abroad indicates some lack of co-ordina-
tion and duplication of effort. For example, export pricing and policy
supervision of promotional activities are handled by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture. Export promotional activities are handled by the semi-
autonomous producer cooperators. The bulk of grain merchandising and sales
are handled by the trade of six large grain corporations.
It must be stated that while there la a high degree of cooperation
between government, trade, and cooperator, nevertheless it is difficult to
promote U.S. wheat effectively against a co-ordinated export egency such as
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the Canadian Wheat Board. This la particularly true when the U.S. coopera-
tora and government agencies cannot deliver the grain which their market
development actlvltlea stimulate. They can and do advlae the trade of new
grain orders, but, in the final analysis, eech aale muat appear to offer an
opportunity for profit which is the basic criteria uaed by the trade in
deciding whether a given order i* worthwhile considering.
Since the U.S. government policy la to expand commercial grain
exports, the achievement of this goal requires a cloae study of the effec-
tiveness of the present export promotional system. In the case of feed
grains, promotional activities are useful because the U.S. la the dominant
force in the market. In the case of wheat, foreign competition accentuates
the problem and seems to spotlight a key policy issue, namely that the U.S.
government should examine whether or not it would be better to leave export
promotional activities to the owners of the wheat (the grain trade) or make
the necessary institutional adjustments which would coordinate the export
promotional activities of cooperators, government, and trade under a semi-
government wheat export authority.
It is possible that the grain trade might promote U.S. grain sales
most efficiently if given long-term objectives and promotional assistance.
On the other hand, the government's regulatory role In the grain trade is
increasing. It now covers production, storage, grading, export pricing,
compliance with International grain arrangements, and world food aid dona-
tions.
It is likely that the successful promotion of commercial wheat exports
will inevitably require Increasing participation by government agencies. It
is possible that a wheat Export Authority might coordinate grading, export
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pricing, and market development more efficiently than the present system and
by ao doing put U.S. wheat on an equal footing with Canadian wheat. If the
Government fundi normally allocated to the wheat market development coopara-
tors waa used to operate a pilot wheat aalea agency there would be leas
likelihood of wasting the taxpayara money. Such a pilot agency might be
efficiently operated as a branch agency of the Commodity Credit Corporation.
Its success could be measured in terms of new markets developed and increased
sales volume in these new markets. The growth of regional integration
systems seems to suggest that the future terms of trade between Imports
and exports of grain will be decided by official negotiation. A Mheat
Export Authority would have definite advantages under such circumstances
from an export promotional point of view.
Feed Grains
Future exports of U.S. feed grains may be hampered by limited market
accessibility caused by high Import levies. The U.S. la the dominant force
In the world* s expanding feed grains market. U.S. Feed Grains Council
studies show that In the case of Europe, livestock producers ere tending
to specialize.
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Further atudies indicate that European producers paid an average of
$98 per ton for mixed feed during 1960-64. This relatively high price waa
caused by protection of domestic grain production through levies on Imports.
U.S.F.G.C, National University of Ireland, Cooperative Feed
Experimental Project No. 1 . 1962.
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U.S.F.G.C. Series, National Unlveraity of Ireland, Cooperative Feed
Experiment. Project 3. 1965.
These studies further suggest that many farmers in the north and west of
Europe would be more profitably employed in livestock production rather than
grain production mainly because of high rainfall. The study pointed out
that free imports of feed grains at world pricea would increase bog and
broiler profits by one-third. The study further suggests the grave need
for cheap grain imports at world pricea during January-June period In
Europe in order to maintain a constant supply of fat beef cattle for the
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expanding beef alaughter industry.
U.S. feed grain interests might best be promoted in Europe by attempt-
ing to reduce feed grain import levies by direct government consultation or
by administering a specific public relations program aimed at European meat
producers and consumers. Uhlle many European livestock producers are grain
growers, the trend Is toward specialization. A U.S. feed grains promotion
should aim at convincing the European livestock producer that he would have
higher profits from cheaper Imported grain. The second approach would be
aimed at convincing the European meat consumer that he would have cheaper
and better meat and more of It if the United States were allowed to sell its
quality grains at world pricea In Europe.
"ibid... p. 26.
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0>Kaefe, Irish Farmers Journal. April 14, 1966, Editorial .
7
0p.. sit., p. 10.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Reports
Ambassade Da trance, Fraaa Service, Charlaa da Gaulle. Brltlah Entry to the
E.E.C . Parla, May 16, 1967.
Blau, G. International Conmodltv Arrangements and Policies. Food and
Agriculture Organization of the U.W., Commodity Policy Studlea No. 1.
Rome, 1964.
Brunthaver, C. G. U.K. Grain Agreement. Format for an International Grain
Agreement . Grain and feed Dealere National Aaaoclatlon. 1964.
Buttarwick, M. H. and E. Neville Rolfe. Market Structure of Benelux Porta.
U.S. Feed Grains Council, Oxford University. October, 1966.
Deleau, J. Proceedings of the 15th General Conference . International
Federation of Agricultural Producers, London, England. 1966.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N. Regional Integratin g "rtlMIH
Outside Europe Affecting Trade in Graina . C.R. 67/5, Study Group on
Grains, Item XII 1 of the Agenda. March, 1967.
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations. Agricultural
Commodities Projections for 1970 . .Supplement, E/an 13/48, CCP 6215,
Roma, Italy. 1962.
General Agreements for Tariffs and Trade. News Bulletin . No. XVII.
February 27, 1967.
International Wheat Council. Trends and Problems in the World Grain
Economy 1950-1970. 1966.
International Wheat Council. Review of the World Uheat Situation . 1966.
Organization for European Cooperation and Development. Food Aid—Its Role
in Economic Development . March, 1964.
Palmby, C. Information Bulletin J14-64 . U.S. Feed Graina Council,
Washington, D.C. Auguat, 1964.
Rlchter, J. H. World Agriculture. Vol. XV; No. 4. October, 1966.
Schertz, L. P. and Koy L. Nealey. Barrlera to International Grain Trade in
Selected Countries. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricul-
tural Service Report, No. 126. May, 1965.
u
66
The National Agricultural Advisory Commission. Report of Subcommittee «j
food and fiber Reserves for National Security. Washington, D.C.
October, 1964.
U.S. Congress. "Food for Peace" Report No. 2304. 69th Congress, 2nd
Session, House of Representatives.
U.S. Congress. Trade Brpanaion Act . 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Public
Law 87-794. October 11, 1962.
U.S. Congress. Report of Congressional Agricultural Hearings. B8th
Congress, 2nd Session. November 14, 1966.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Grain Market News . Vol. 15, No. 23. June
9, 1967.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Annual Report "food for Peace." Public
Law 480. 1965.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, "frame's Key i*>U U ttl C»*u iMiM fff
the Europeajn fiEgnomic Community ." foreign Agricultural Service Report,
No. 122, Washington, D.C. April, 1963.
U.S. Department of Agriculture. The World Agricultural Situation—Review of
1966 and Outlook for 1967 . foreign Agricultural Economic Report, No. 33,
January 4, 1967.
U.S. Feed Gralna Council. E.E.C. Position Paper . April, 1967.
U.S. Feed Grains Council. National University of Ireland, Cooperative
Research Protect No. 1. 1962.
Articles and Periodicals
Dreyer, H. P. "World Grain Pact Still Cloudy," Journal of Commerce . April,
1967.
Kllpatrick, C. "More Grain is Allocated for India," Washington Post .
February 4, 1967.
"No Substantial Rise Planned for P.L. 480," Southwestern Miller . January 31,
1967.
O'keefe, P. Iriah farmer Journal . Editorial, Dublin, April 14, 1966.
"Report on President's Budget Speech," Southwestern Millar . January 31,
1967.
Staff Report. "Cut of 12% In Wheat Acreage Allotments Expected in Response
to Producer Pleaa," Wall Street Journal. May 18, 1967.
67
Schnittker, J. A., Undersecretary of Agriculture. "The Kennedy Round:
Three Year* of Trade, " Foreign Agriculture . Vol. 5, No. 23, June 5,
1967.
Widener, A. ''Paving Hunger with Good Intentions," Bmf" ''"ftTi August 6,
1967.
other sources
Conversation (telephones with Official of Louis Dreyfus Corporation,
Minneapolis Grain Exchange, May 25, 1967.
Davis, H. J., U.S. Department of Agriculture, foreign Agricultural Service,
Memorandum to Agricultural Attaches, Subject: Hew Public Law 480
Programs. October, 1966.
Letter from Mr. Clarence Palnby, Director of the United States Feed Grains
Council to Secretary of Agriculture, Orville Freeman. February 3,
1967.
Letter from Mr. Clarence Palmby to Ambassador William Roth, Chief U.S.
Delegation to the G.A.T.T. Negotiations. February, 1967.
Schnittker, J. A., Undersecretary of Agriculture, Address National Associa-
tion of Wheat Growers, Seattle, Washington. January 16, 1967.
Schnittker, J. A., Undersecretary of Agriculture, Address (U.S. Department
of Agriculture No. 1681-67), Salina, Kansas. June 5, 1967.
Trade Sourcea, Conversation with Officials of Great Plains Wheat Inc.,
Washington, D.C. February 4, 1967.
A REVIEW Of INTERNATIONAL GRAIN TRADE ARRANGEMENTS
AND THE 1967 NEGOTIATIONS OF THE GENERAL
AGREEMENTS FOR TARIFFS AND TRADE
MARCUS J. McINERNEY
B. Agr. Sc., National University of Ireland, 1960
AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S REPORT
submitted In partial fulfillment of the
requirement* for the degree
MASTER OF SCIENCE
Department of Economics
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas
1967
This la a review of world grain trading arrangement* with special
reference to regional Integration systems, the world grain situation,
national grain policies and the new grain arrangement negotiated at the
Kennedy Round of G.A.T.T. negotiations.
The objective of the report la to Identify broad trends in the grain
industry and to try to analyse how these trends will affect U.S. grain
exports during the coating decade.
vtorld grain production and trade are increasing steadily each year.
F.A.O. sources indicated that world grain production will Increase by 3
percent per annum between 1967 and 1977. Jorld trad* in grain Is also
expected to increaae but at a slower rata.
The following factors will affect the volume of world grain produc-
tion and trade.
(a) The success of regional Integration schemes with respect to
protecting high-cost producers.
(b> The ability of consumers and livestock producers within the
integrated areas and the other traditional grain importing
nations to lobby for cheaper grain Imports.
(c) The volume of production from centrally planned economies.
(d) The extent to which technology and institutional Improvement
are applied to the agriculture areaa of Latin America and Africa.
The European Common Market la having a major effect on world grain
policies. Since the E.E.C. waa formed, lta Imports, exports and production
of grain have Increased. Nevertheless no third country can be guaranteed a
future place In thla market. The E.E.C. grain Import policies are becoming
evident in the U.K., Denmark, L.A.F.T.A., C.A.I. S. and the A.CM.
The affects of L.A.F.T.A., C.A.l.S. and A.CM. on world grain trade
ay not be significant for some tlae.
International commodity agreements In grain are likely to assume oore
importance In future years because world food requirements have reached a
high level of International concern. Such agreements help to (aj balance
supply and demand, (b) stabilize prices, and (c) guarantee future market
outlets. The new grains agreement which resulted from the Kennedy Round of
G.A.T.T. Is an improvement of the old International Wheat Agreement.
A comprehensive international grain arrangement would cover all
grains. It would ideally have to have built in supply management quotas,
and would be reaponsible for all world food aid shipments. Its pricing
structure would have to be geared to meet the requirements of underdeveloped
and developed countriea. Developed countries would have to give some grain
market access guarantees If producer countries pledged maximum price levels.
The new three year grain arrangement which resulted from the 1967
G.A.T.T. negotiations provides for a wheat price minimum of $1.73 a bushel
for Hard Red Winter wheat f .o.b. the Gulf, and for 4.5 million tons of
multilateral food aid.
Reliable sources consider that domestic and export prices of U.S.
wheat will be 10-25 cents higher during the next three years than during
the previous three years. The higher price may stimulate world production.
The multilateral food aid may provide a market vacuum of two million tons
of wheat In Europe. Beyond this the United States is still left with three-
fourths of the world food aid burden.
The long term increase in United States exports of wheat will likely
be to the developing countriea and attempts should be made to help those
markets achieve commercial status quickly. This can be done by vlgoroue
market development where the United Statea government owns the wheat and
grain it promotes. Long tens United States exports of feed grains offer
phenomenal prospects in Europe, Japan, and the developed countries because
of the huge demand for red meat. The United states must aim at convincing
the affluent consumers and the skilled livestock producers in these regions
that their mutual interests would be beat served when and only when their
governments allow free Importation of high quality low cost feed grain.
